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ARMY TALKS



What To Do With Germany!



RESTRICTED - EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS - UNITED STATES ARMY

A LETTER FROM THE EDITOR OF



This issue of ARMY TALKS is the first one to be printed and published in France. That is an important step for the publication and for you. It is important for one essential reason: it is bringing ARMY TALKS closer to the men who are fighting this war. These books are written for the men and they are doing their job only when they reach the men. There is no satisfaction to the staff who knock out each issue if the magazine fails to reach the men out in front.

That is where you can help us. As you will see by looking on the inside back cover, we are not soothed into happy contentment by our satisfied customers. But despite the knocks, we want to get those letters. If your outfit is not receiving the proper number of ARMY TALKS — that number is ten per company — let us

know. No matter where you are, we will try to get the book to you.

Perhaps we sound more eager to get the goods to you than you are to receive them. I hope not, but if so, think along with me for a few more lines. This leaflet, sometimes ten pages, sometimes twenty or twenty-four, is handing to the American Army in Europe the straightest thinking on the most important matters that involve every man in it. It is material intended to stir up the thinking of the soldier. It is material to be argued about and disagreed about. It is brain fodder for the American way of life.

When the ARMY TALKS get to you, see that they get to your men. Lead the discussion if you can, but give those men a chance to bull and grouse — and think.

When the ARMY TALKS don't get to you, let us know. We don't let you down if we can possibly help it. If you have criticisms and ideas, we want them. This is strictly not a canned program. It is an American program for the most important men in the world.

THE EDITOR.

"The purpose of the program is to give the soldier psychological preparation for combat, and a better realization of the import of every phase of his military training. Emphasis will be placed on combat orientation. The mental and physical conditioning of the enemy, and a proper evaluation of the enemy's weapons and fighting qualities will be stressed. A better understanding of the background of the war, and the soldier's responsibilities in the post-war world will also be developed..."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER.

(Extract from letter ETO, 1 August, 1944, AG 352/2 OpSS Subject: Combat Orientation Program)



ARMY TALKS

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

What To Do With Germany!

There are few soldiers, and for that matter Americans, who would not agree with the words of the President when he said in a broadcast five years ago:

"I hate war!"

Since then we have learned, the hard way, that it is not enough simply to *hate* war. The time comes, in this imperfect world of ours, when we have to *fight* a war. It boils down then to a very simple, yet harsh, fact: we have to kill or be killed. And Americans don't enjoy either alternative.

One of the things that has made life difficult for us is that certain nations take the opposite point of view. They *like* war. They revel in fighting. As individuals, many of them enjoy killing. That they should enjoy being killed is incredible to us. Perhaps "enjoy" isn't exactly the right word, but we know from innumerable kinds of evidence that they glory in battle, and are trained to die for the Emperor or for the Fuehrer.

Twice in a generation the Germans have thrown the world into an unholy mess. Twice we've had to do something about it. It is that "twice" which is particularly disturbing. It ought to disturb us.



Once may be understandable. But twice...? Maybe we (and we have lots of company) are just too dumb to learn from experience. Or are we?

Not if we can understand exactly how the Germans craftily played us for easy marks after World War I; not if we see clearly why, and how, we let them get away with it *then*. Not if we find out what errors were made in winding up World War I and in trying to induce the Germans to keep the peace thereafter.

Not if we realize that our toughest time will come after *the Germans are militarily smashed on the battlefield.*

We will arrive at that moment when the war in Europe is won O.K. What do we do next? Two things:

1. We (that means all the United Nations) turn to and beat the Japs.

2. We take measures to make sure that it doesn't happen again.

No 2 simply means that we "win the peace." That is a phrase which is loosely bandied about. It has been used and abused until it has come to sound commonplace and threadbare. But don't shy away from it. Don't forget it.

No Problem is More Important

No problem more important, or more difficult will face us as long as the youngest of us is alive. We didn't win the peace last time Why?



There is an answer. And it is an obvious one, for all who have hearts that can feel and for all who have minds that are not closed. But, first, three prefatory remarks may be useful:

1. The writer of this ARMY TALKS is one of that older generation, one of a fairish number who "are going around the course a second time." He is not a regular Army man but, counting both wars, has had nearly six years in uniform. He is getting tired of war.

2. So much for the intrusion of the writer. Now, about you. Most of you weren't born when World War I started; or, probably, when it ended. In reading this ARMY TALKS, or in discussing this topic, you'll have to be prepared to find much of the "history" you thought you knew is being turned topsy-turvy.

3. And now about this TALK itself: within the space permitted it is not possible to give proof of every statement made. Some may seem flat-footed, unsupported assertions. But don't let that disturb you. The facts, starkly as they may be stated can be proved to the hilt. Soft or harsh, the peace terms weren't enforced.

Why didn't we win the peace last time?

The answer is simple:

We were careless.

We were soft.

We wanted to get back to 1914 normalcy.

The Germans weaseled their way out.

The Reasons Behind the Four Points

The answer is easy, but all the *reasons behind* these four points are not so simple.

We were careless. Sure we were, and so were the British. We—that is most of us—didn't like to keep an enemy down. We didn't *really know* the enemy. We were soft because of our temperament, and because of our ignorance of what the German really is.

We wanted to get back to normalcy. Most of us want to go home now. But we, or our children, will have to put on uniforms for World War III, if we don't grasp the essential fact that, in uniform or out, we have to keep at this job of winning the peace. We have to see that the Government (and that means a majority of all of us) acts toward Germany in such a way that World War III will never happen. Here's what a former American Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, has to say about this in his recent book, *The Time for Decision*:

"The point of view that a great number of men in the armed forces adopted upon their return home swelled the changing current of popular sentiment. The government had done little, if anything, during the war months to keep the men in the Army and Navy informed of the great issues involved in the League Covenant and Peace Treaty, and of the reasons for their government's policy. Although our men by the hundreds of thousands had gone to the war on fire with enthusiasm for the ideals which Woodrow Wilson had held up before their eyes, they returned home in a far different frame of mind. *The idea that their sacrifices were only half paid for by their victory had never been hammered home to them.* They had not been given the chance to realize that the contributions in blood and treasure made toward winning the war could only be justified if the people of the United States insisted that their government adopt a policy designed to prevent these sacrifices from being again demanded of themselves or of their sons."

(This time, ARMY TALKS, orientation and discussion groups generally, are designed to tackle the problem, where Sumner Welles alleges that the government fell down last time.)

The Germans weaseled their way out.

Now we come to the story of how they defeated the peace treaty, by means which we are just now seeing in the full light of day.

For Some Errors We Were to Blame


1. Two weeks before the Armistice, General Pershing told President Wilson that he didn't want an Armistice. The line that Generals Pershing and Bliss wanted to take was "to continue the war until the destruction of the German Army would appear plainly as a purely military event." Top American *military* authorities wanted to push Allied armies forward into the Reich, right into Berlin.

Wilson objected. Why? Here are the words of his reason, in a telegram of instruction to his representative, Col. House:

"Because it is certain that too much success or security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible."

Error One: On a military subject, statesmen failed to take the advice of the military authorities.

2. The terms on which Germany was granted peace, signed at Versailles 28 June 1919, were the result of much harried pondering and were arrived at only after prolonged and difficult conferences between the negotiators of the four leading victorious nations. The terms were determined after more than six months' discussion and consideration. They were not adequate and they weren't lived up to!



The Big Four conducted the negotiations: Woodrow Wilson for the United States, Lloyd George for Great Britain; Clemenceau for France, and Orlando for Italy. There were acute differences of opinion on almost every subject: freedom of the

seas against blockade; long-term occupation of Germany; separation of slices of territory from the Reich; the extent of German disarmament; punishment of war criminals; guarantees of France against future German aggression; reparations, and the practical value of a League of Nations.

The Possibilities of a League

Wilson was so impressed with the possibilities of a League of Nations that he showed little sympathy with many points of view brought up by the others, because the pat answer ready was that such-and-such questions could be left to the League to consider—later. This attitude was too problematic for many of the other nations, especially France. Clemenceau recognized that, for the time being, Germany was too weak to fight, but he was looking forward to a period ten, fifteen or twenty years later when Germany might be strong enough to start another World War. He, quite naturally, wanted above all to make France secure from another aggression.

Error Two: We, the victors, quarrelled amongst ourselves, then and later, which was just what the Germans hoped for

During the Paris peace terms discussions, there was no full understanding—even by the French—of the real nature of the German State and the German people. We probably showed

the least effective knowledge because we had had less opportunity for intimate contact with the enemy

Some of the things not fully grasped were:


German democracy was shallow. History teaches us that democratic principles cannot be imposed on a nation. They can't even be granted. They have to be

won the hard way. That's how we got our freedom, our Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

The majority of Germans like to be regimented. They revel in the goose-step. They prefer to be told what to do.

They believe war is natural and glorious. We don't.

They believe they are a *Herrenvolk*—a master race that must rule and exploit lesser breeds. We think ours is "God's country," and think pretty well of ourselves, but we don't want to enslave other nations.



They lay down a one-sided education, in which from kindergarten to university the youth are crammed with a false and perverted version of history. We at least seek the truth. We don't ban and burn books.

A German professor, Karl A. Kuhn, boils it all down to twenty-two words, in his book, *The True Causes of the War*:

"Must *Kultur* rear its domes over mountains of corpses, oceans of tears and the death rattle of the conquered? Yes, it must!"


A few courageous democrats, writers and ministers revolted against this doctrine. All honor to them, but they are in a minority (just as today we find only a few sturdy exceptions such as Thomas Mann, Einstein and Cardinal Falhauber). The majority, through the past eighty years, has either been silent, or chimed in with Pastor Naumann, an economist, who said:

"Everything must be made subservient to the next war."

Whether or not Naumann endorsed this principle, he certainly recognized what was going on, and saw that each of Germany's aggressive wars must inevitably lead to new wars.

The Blood-Red Thread of Germany

In the previous World War, in this war, and *between* wars this theme has run like a blood-red thread through all classes of Germans. There is no purpose to be served in taking up space here to relate what Hitler, and the Germans under Hitler, have said. Their views are too recent and too well-known to need repetition.



Another point we were slow to grasp last time, and may *not yet* fully realize, is the influence which the Prussians (mostly the *Junker* class) and through them the General Staff of the German Army have had in causing war after war. On this point there is a good American witness, Sumner Welles, who speaks

from a life-time on the inside of the welter of international relations. In his recent book, Welles writes:

"It is their (the Prussians) teaching and their concept which made Germany during the last 100

years the bane of Europe, and today the curse of the entire civilized world. It is their unholy inspiration that brought into being the German General Staff. And that instrument is responsible for the havoc which Germany has been able to wreak upon mankind during the present century

"It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff."

This is confirmed by many other writers, British, French and even German. It has been confirmed by the record of Hitler's career

The Danger of World War III

But, ironically, in the solution of this problem Hitler may be on *our* side in World War II: If he keeps on firing, imprisoning and murdering generals as he did after the generals' *Putsch* (plot) that broke into print July 20th of this year.

There is still a further lesson that we were very vague about in 1919: we thought there existed in Germany sufficiently sturdy seeds of democracy to enable the Germans to develop self-governing principles and a republican form of government. But they weren't there, those seeds; or at least they were few or sterile

On this subject the Germans fooled us for a while, in fact for several years. The Weimar Constitution looked nice on paper, but it had neither reality nor soul. The Germans threw out the Kaiser, about thirty hours before the Armistice took effect. A revolution of the workers was announced. An ex-saddle-maker




named Ebert became president of the synthetic republic. Privately, Ebert said that he "hated revolution like sin" *

And what was the German General Staff doing about this supposed People's Revolution? General Groener, Chief of the General Staff, gave the game away and showed the revolution to be a naked fake, when he testified in a German court in 1925:

"From the very beginning, Ebert and I fought (against) the revolution together."

But of course in 1919 we couldn't be expected to realize this skullduggery, although a careful study of German history should have put our leaders wise.

Error 3. We hadn't studied German history and psychology; or, if so, we'd studied under the wrong teachers.



Here you have three of the serious errors we made. The Germans cried, worked and bluffed their way out of the Versailles Treaty, during the next twenty years, and

added to our and the world's troubles. Here, in skeleton outline only, are some of the things they put over on the rather complacent outside world:

German Defiance of Versailles Treaty

1. The first defiance of the Versailles Treaty came June 21 1919—one week *before* the treaty was signed. The German fleet, as soon as it entered Scapa Flow, Scotland, to surrender was scuttled by the *officers* of the German High Command. This lost to the Allies eleven battleships, five cruisers and forty-eight destroyers.

2. In the Versailles Treaty, Germany promised to hand over the war-guilty for trial by the Allied and Associated powers. The outrages were headed up by the Kaiser, and those listed ran into the thousands. Did we try them? Don't be credulous, now that you have gone this far.

First, the Kaiser. Lloyd George won an election in December, 1918, with the slogan "Hang the Kaiser." But the Kaiser wasn't hanged. He wasn't even tried. He beat the gun by getting to Holland a few hours ahead of the Armistice. The Dutch called him a "political" refugee, and wouldn't give him up. (A couple of adventurous American officers tried to kidnap him, but failed.) So that was that, and the ex-Kaiser chopped wood at Doorn for twenty years and more until he died in his bed.

3 Then the Germans weaseled their promise to hand over the other war criminals for Allied trial. They persuaded us to permit trial by a *German court*, on the ground that it would dishonor these fine fellows to be tried by foreigners. The trial was duly held in Leipzig. At first there were 1,500 on the war criminal list. Then the list shrunk to 892. Of this lot, Britain demanded the trial of 97; Belgium of 334; France also of 334; Italy of 29, Poland of 57, and Rumania of 41. The United States agreed to forget all about it.

But when the trial started, the list to be put in the dock by Germany mysteriously shrunk again—to fourteen. Wearily, the Allies prepared evidence against seven. But Germany couldn't "find" three of these, so *four* ultimately faced the judges. They got minor sentences, but whether or not these sentences were served history does not record clearly.

There is the Lesson for This Time

4 The members of the Big Four in Paris, you will recall from a previous page, agreed that Germany ought to lose some territory. Germany did, but never left off whining to get it back. Shortly before the end of World War I, when it was clear that the German General Staff and the Kaiser, had lost that gamble, a prominent German was asked by a Swiss:


"What will you do if you lose the war?"

The German knew the answer, and knew above all something about Anglo-Saxon psychology, and replied:

"We will organize sympathy!"

Some territories, like the Saar and the Rhineland (which had been demilitarized) they got back later, because other nations became apathetic and "went soft." The balance in Europe, and much more to boot, Hitler got back later. Allied armed forces were to have remained in the Rhineland for fifteen years. They pulled out their final token occupation forces in eleven years.

5 You have heard a lot about reparations. Germany started off owing a huge amount, more than economists could figure out how to transfer from the Reich to those who hoped



to get it. This figure was progressively scaled down in the Dawes, Young and other plans, until with the Hoover moratorium reparations finally disappeared.



This fantastic financial hocus-pocus did not occur under Hitler. It was all ended before Hitler came to power. The sleight-of-hand financiers were the leaders of *republican* Germany. They managed to borrow (largely from the United States) from six to ten times as much, *in cash*, as they paid out in repara-


tions, *in cash*. Total figures will not be given here, because they cause headaches even to financiers and economists who usually dote on such things. But three items of curious and important interest may be mentioned, before leaving this involved subject.

German Inflation Organized by Reich

Germany pleaded poverty and inability to pay, giving her inflation as one reason. But this inflation, which wiped out *all* German internal debt, was deliberately organized by Reich bankers, industrialists and Junkers. The figures of the German mark became a grim joke—for those who didn't have marks. Here's what happened. The pre-World War I mark was worth four to the dollar. In October, 1923, it was 4,200,000,000 to the dollar! Champagne, in the Hotel Adlon bar, was five cents a bottle, if you had dollars! Then the mark was stabilized at *one-trillionth* of its former value.

The second item has to do with the amount of the reparations charged against Germany in 1919, as compared with the sum that Germany exacted from France in 1871. After the Franco-Prussian war the reparations figure was set, roughly, at twice what the war cost Germany. If the Allies had followed this precedent the 1919 figure demanded from Germany would have been eight times the sum we tried to get!

The third item compares reparations that Germany was asked to pay with the amount that Germany exacted—and exacts—from occupied countries in this war. Pickings have probably got a bit leaner as the occupation continued, but for



a period Germany collected—mostly in goods—*every forty-one days*, a sum equal to the original amount she was asked to pay after the first war as total reparations *each year* for World War I damages!

6. Germany, under the Weimar Republic and under the Nazis, signed treaty after treaty, but broke them all. Germany pretended to want peace, but the German General Staff, the industrialists, the so-called democratic-Socialists and the Nazis all wanted, and intended the same thing: a war of revenge. They rearmed, from the very first days after the Armistice was signed. They were restricted to 100,000 standing army, but before Hitler came to power they had actually at least 250,000, plus the illegal "Black Reichswehr," and labor battalions. They were forbidden airplanes and tanks, so they built them secretly. They were forbidden submarines so they had them built and tested in another country.

They fooled the Armaments Control Commission at every turn. In 1925 General Malcolm, the British member of the commission, reported (in a 504-page document) that Germany was *not* by any means disarmed, in fact was rearming, but the British and Belgian governments buried the report, and, weary of the whole thing, turned away.



German Propaganda Split the Allies

German propaganda spread like a pestilence over the world, and soothed, irritated—but always split—the erstwhile Allies. We didn't want to recognize that Hitler's shrill shriekings were the truth. He was believed whenever he shouted that "this was his last demand," because that is what we wanted to believe. The world turned a deaf ear because it so badly wanted peace. The British, in 1935, cast 11,000,000 votes in a peace ballot, which urged the Government to back up the League of Nations, and in the same breath demanded that all nations of the League reduce their armaments. We weren't any more consistent, less if possible, and starved our forces, army, navy and air. Unfortunately, collective security was already collapsing. It was the pitiable period of appeasement.

The culminating tragi-farce came with the Munich settle-

ment: Hitler's "final" demand: A British premier was cheered when he returned with Hitler's signature on a scrap of paper



indicating "Peace in Our Time." Six months later the world began to come out of its trance when Hitler marched into Prague. A month later, in April, 1939, the British introduced conscription. In September, 1940, the United States introduced Selective Service

So that's how it went, and how Germany's diabolical determination to rule the world *finally* woke us up. That's how

Germany over-ran every nation in Europe except six. This is World War II, but it represents the fifth aggressive war in 75 years for which Germany under the German General Staff is responsible. Don't forget what they did before 1914: Denmark (a war of aggression) in 1864; Austria (a war of aggression) in 1866; France (a war of aggression) in 1870.

How Are We Going to Treat Germany?

After all these experiences we have had excellent opportunity to *learn how to treat the Germans this time*. In one way it is fortunate that World War II has come so soon after World War I because there are hundreds of millions still active who have been able to observe the results of German qualities in both wars. We have our records and our memories. We have millions of dead and maimed. We, in the United States, have a war debt ten times what it was a few years ago. We have our multiplied taxes. We have our ration books and our coupons. We have had our peaceful lives interrupted.

Will we put up with this thing, again and again and again? Just because the Germans want to take over civilization, and run it their way? If we don't intend to put up with it, then we have to decide how to handle this German problem; and when we decide, stick to it, without getting soft or "sporting" about it. "Ways and means" brains have been working out the various factors of the solution. Without discussing the rights or wrongs, the ease or the difficulties, whether we *will* do it, whether we *should*, let's see what has been suggested:

1. *We intend to occupy Germany.* This is more than a suggestion. It is a statement of fact. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have announced this officially. The respective *areas* of occupation have not been

officially announced, but an informed opinion, resulting from the Teheran Conference, will be found on studying the map on this page



Disarmament, Control, Punishment

2. We intend to disarm Germany. This means economic disarmament as well as military. It also means breaking the Junkers' control, and that of the German General Staff.

3. We intend to control Germany. It follows that this will be done, for a period, when we reach Point 1. The period of

control is widely debated. Some say ten years. Others say forty years.

4. *We intend to punish guilty Germans.* This is official, as a result of the statement issued by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, November 1, 1943, after the Moscow Conference.

5. *On the subject of reparations.* Ideas on this point have not yet crystallized into methods and figures. Stalin and leaders of occupied areas have urged that the German reservoir of labor be used in rehabilitation of the destruction their armies have wreaked. Bitten by statistics last time, we shy off this time.

6. *Territorial adjustments.* It is taken for granted that all looted land will be returned to owners. Exactly *which* owners, as of what date, has not been determined. Some favor dividing Germany into small parts. Sumner Welles urges partition into three parts: Southern Germany, comprising Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Rhineland, Saar; Central Germany, including Upper Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg and Hamburg; North-East Germany, with Prussia (exclusive of East Prussia which may go to Poland), Mecklenburg and Saxony.

7. *Re-education of Germans.* Lord Vansittart, for forty years in the British Foreign Office, says in *Lessons of My Life*:

"This German generation is admittedly incurable... A new and retaught generation will have to replace the incurables. We must perforce leave open the date of safety. Our successors alone can decide."

The great argument on this subject revolves around the question of "Who shall undertake the re-education?"—shall it be done from outside, or left to Germans under our direction?

8. *The problem of the German people.* They will be fed. But their responsibility as a people, the shallowness of their democratic experience, and their proneness toward obeying aggressive and ruthless leaders is increasingly recognized.

9. *Our continuing responsibility.* It is being stressed, although by no means yet accepted in the United States, that the "same intense planning and torrents of energy" which win wars must be devoted to "winning the peace." As a distin-



How to prepare this Army Talk

Twenty-six years ago, the nations of the world asked themselves: "What to do with Germany?" Today we are having to ask it again. But the asking is the easier part. The question must be answered by you and me and every other G.I. who has been sweating it out over here for more than two years.

We can beat the Germans. We are giving them one of the worst beatings in history. It cannot be too thorough. But don't let us think for a minute that a thorough thrashing will solve the problem of Germany. It is the first step, and it must be done as ruthlessly and as completely as possible. But after that, what?

This issue of ARMY TALKS, written by a soldier who served in the last war as well as in this, brings back the attitudes and the errors of a quarter of a century ago. History is often made by men who have learned very little from history.

Nobody is in a stronger position, nobody has more at stake in this war than those men who have fought in it. If we fail to stop and reflect and try to answer the repeated "What do you think?" of this ARMY TALKS, we may be guilty of fighting without knowing why.

Every man in the American Army owes it to himself and to his family to have some answers. They won't all agree, but they should all make sense. Let's examine the errors of Versailles. Let's reconsider the history written between 1918 and 1939 and let's attempt to puzzle out the toughest problem with which men saddle the world—war.

You may not believe in a League of Nations. You may smile at the idea of an international police force, but they are great thoughts, they are ideas which cannot be dismissed without consideration. They are at least efforts to solve the problem. Whether Germany is to be occupied for ten years; whether Germany can be re-educated to a less war-like attitude; whether there is a Nazi and a German—these are some of the questions we must answer. *What do you think?*



OOOPS — SORRY


Army Talks of 27 September 1944 (You're Really in the Army Now) says on page 13 not to take sulfa tablets unless you have a full canteen of water (or wine). Here's an important change :

Sulfa tablets should always be taken with fluid, preferably a pint of water. If water isn't immediately available, don't wait for it. Chew up the pills and swallow them, but be sure to drink as soon afterwards as possible.

Yes, it's safe to take sulfa dry, because in almost every case, you can get some water or wine within a few hours from the time the pills were taken. If you can't get it yourself, the Medics are always on the job and will get it for you.

In World War 1, practically every wound became infected. With the use of sulfa, an infected wound in this war is rare. As a result, those little white pills alone have saved many thousands of lives. So don't be afraid to use them. You can worry about getting the water afterwards, if you don't have it with you.

Morale Builders



The war is out of France, across Belgium and into Germany. All of the boasts and promises of Goering and Goebbels have been to no avail. The military operations move according to plan — to our plan — and our men are winning. What they have learned about what they are fighting for has helped them smash across the last frontier, and at the same time keep even with the score.

That is the job that Orientation has: to give the men the score. The topic of this issue will be briefed in Warweek and put on the air by American Forces Network. For the men in Germany and the men moving up, it is of the first importance. If you can possibly do it, hold a discussion. If not, spread ten copies through the company and let everyone have the opportunity to read them.

ARMY TALKS ON THE AIR

Tune in on your American Forces Network station for a dramatized presentation of the week's ARMY TALKS. Tie it up with your talk, use it as a self-starter for the discussion.

Time : 1030 Saturday 21 October 1944.

Choose any convenient spot where you have a radio and a room for your platoon to listen in and follow up discussing the subject.

ARMY TALKS IN THE NEWS

The subject matter of this week's ARMY TALKS will appear in an illustrated GI digest in the Warweek supplement of Stars and Stripes on Thursday 19 October 1944.

Purpose : to enable the soldier to enter the discussion with prior knowledge of the subject. Warweek, official Orientation organ for the ETO, is striving to make the American soldier in this theater the best informed soldier of the world.



1ST *in importance is morale...*

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL